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PRESIDENT'S NOTES 
It is with regret that I announce the 
retirement of Comdr. Robert M. Laske 
after 7 years as Editor of the Naval War 
College Review. Commander Laske, 
more than any other individual, has 
been responsible for enhancing the 
stature of the Review as a respected 
professional journal. He published 5 7 
issues, bringing to his work superior 
editorial skills and high standards of 
excellence. His successor as Editor is Lt. 
Comdr. Benjamin M. Simpson Ill, who 
has been a professor of Strategy and 
Policy here at the College. Lieutenant 
Commander Simpson's credentials for 
his new position are worthy of mention 
-8.A. from Colgate in international
relations, LL.B. from the University of
Pennsylvania, two M.A. 's from the
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy
(international relations and foreign
affairs) and a Ph.D. in diplomatic his­
tory, also from Fletcher. He is himself
an author and critic in his fields of
interest and is widely known in the
political science and historical com­
munities. I am confident that the
Review will continue to prosper under
his leadership.
The next Professional Studies Con· 
ference on the Naval War College 
schedule, to be held in early April, will 
address the subject of "Professional 
Military Ethics." The focus will be on 
"Obedience, Loyalty, and Conscience," 
"The Military Ethic in a Democratic 
Society," "Military Management and 
Professional Ethics," and "Institutional 
and Individual Responsibility." This 
professional conference continues the 
policy of exposing our students to 
differing views of contemporary issues. 
Another recent development has 
been the involvement of the Center for 
War Gaming in a new series of innova­
tive war games developed by the Com­
mander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet. 
Admiral Kidd and his principal sub­
ordinate commanders personally partici­
pated in the first war game, SHARP 
EDGE I, in this new series. The results 
of this war game, as well as the plans for 
the future, will be discussed in the next 
issue of the Naval War College Review. 
�a� 
Julien J. LeBourgeois 
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy 
President, Naval War College 
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2 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW 
For the past 4 years the Naval War College has invited numerous representatives of 
the press and television to meet with the students in plenary sessions and in smaller 
informal groups. These frank and at times heated discussions have produced a greater 
awareness among the students of the role of the news media in a free society. As Mr. 
Migdail describes in some detail, it has also led to a greater understanding of the 
problems and feelings of the professional military officers. 
A PERSPECTIVE OF THE MILITARY AND THE MEDIA 
by 
Carl J. Migdail 
It should be apparent after these past 
2 days that the characteristics of the 
media in our society are diversity and 
competition, not conformity. In our 
country, fortunately, there is no spokes• 
man for the media. l
1 
therefore, tonight 
speak only for myself as a member of 
the media. My comments and my con­
clusions are my own, drawn from my 
own experiences. 
My personal reaction to the Military­
Media Conferences is also useful, I 
believe, in providing a vantage point 
from which to comment on our discus­
sions here, our respective roles in Ameri­
can society, our relationship to each 
other, and what I see ahead for our 
country. 
When I attended last year's Military­
Media Conference, it was an end for me 
of a period of almost 25 years without 
close contact with the military of my 
own country. The conference 1 there­
fore, was for me a revelation, a highly 
worthwhile learning experience. It en­
abled me to catch up, in a 2-day cram 
course, to what had happened to the 
military since 1950. 
Even with only two Military-Media 
Conferences behind me, I note contrasts 
and changes in attitudes. This reflects 
the acceleration of movement through­
out the world. Last year, when we met, 
the war in Vietnam was still on. Now 
the defeat is behind us. 
In many respects, looking back over 
the years, I find that our two profes· 
sions have moved on somewhat similar 
courses. We have both, obviously, 
matured with the years. We are both, as 
we should be, troubled about many 
things happening in our own country 
and abroad. Many of us, in the military 
and in the media, are groping for 
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10 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW 
The relaxation of tensions in Europe as a result of d0tente has presented the 
leaders of Communist East Germany1 the German Democratic Republic, with 
additional problems in maintaining combat readiness and political reliability of the 
armed forces. Insistence upon higher standards of technical proficiency, resultfog in 
increased technical education of military personnel1 has been one way in which 
combat readiness has been pursued. Political reliability has been sought by means of 
a revamped and revitalized political organization within the armed forces, and, in this 
thoughtful1 well-researched article, Mr. Herspring discusses the measures adopted by 
the GDR to insure the readiness and reliability of its military establishment. 
THE EFFECT OF DETENTE ON PROFESSIONALISM 
AND 
POLITICAL CONTROL IN THE EAST GERMAN ARMY 
by 
Dale R. Herspring 
How to deal with the gradual move• 
ment toward detente in Europe has 
been one of the most troublesome 
problems facing East German leaders in 
recent years. Few areas exist where 
concern over problems associated with a 
relaxation of tensions has been more 
apparent than in the SED's (Sozialisti­
sche Einheitspartei Deutschlands or 
Socialist Unity Party) handling of the 
NVA (NationaJe Volksarmee or Na­
tional People's Army). 
The NV A is one of the most modern 
armed forces in Europe. 1 In addition to
a modern air force, it possesses a small, 
but modern navy and an army of 
90,000 men divided into six divisions; 
four motorized infantry and two armor. 
As a result of high marks earned in past 
maneuvers and its strategic geographical 
location, the Soviets view the NVA as 
Copyright@ 1976 by Dale R. Herspring. 
an important addition to the Soviet 
forces stationed in the GDR.2 Should
MBFR (Mutual Balanced Force Reduc­
tions) become a reality and Russian 
rather than Eastern European troops 
bear the brunt of reductions, it is 
probable that the importance of the 
NVA within the Warsaw Pact will in­
crease even more. The important 
position which the GDR occupies in the 
Warsaw Pact, like its economic role in 
CMEA (Council of Mutual Economic 
Assistance )1 is a useful bargaining tool in 
its relations with the Soviets. As long as 
the East Germans are able to convince 
the Russians that the NVA is both 
militarily prepared and politically re­
liable, they will be in a good position to 
bargain with the Soviets for favors in 
other areas. 
From all appearances, the Soviets, at 
least at present, remain convinced that 
the NV A fulfills both of these 
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Writing on the basis of his own experience as a systems analyst on the Air Staff 
in Washington, Colonel Tibbetts describes the functions, clients, and performers of 
systems analysis in a service headquarters. In this deceptively breezy .3rticle, far more 
incisive and introspective than his casual style suggests, the author discusses the 
problems and shortcomings of systems analysis from one Pentagon practitioner 1s 
viewpoint, but he also makes a persuasive case for the utility of analytic processes in 
complementing other inputs to decislonmaking. 
A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO SYSTEMS ANALYSIS 
by 
Colonel Lurry N. Tibbetts, U.S. Air ·i,orcc 
What Do '"Analysts" Do? Each of the 
service staffs in Washington has an 
internal capability to perform systems 
analysis, or access to outside analytica� 
agencies, or both. The Air Force has the 
Assistant Chief of Staff, Studies and 
Analysis, with a professional staff of 
nearly 100 officers and civilians. In 
addition, the Air Staff can call on the 
Rand Corporation, Analytical Services 
(ANSER), and other not-for-profit con­
cerns. 
The Army employs the Assistant 
Secretary of the Army (Operations Re­
search) for many analyses, while 
<!farming out" additional work to such 
as the Concepts Analysis Agency (CAA) 
in Bethesda, Md. 
Navy and Marine Corps efforts are 
largely handled by the CNO's Systems 
Analysis Division (OP-96) or the Center 
for Naval Analyses. 
These groups routinely perform anal­
yses of a variety of subjects. The sub­
jects addressed can be loosely grouped 
into three general areas: (1) Analyses of 
major force issues, (2) Supporting 
studies, and (3) Technical papers and 
Hmfnianalyses." 
Analyses of major issues are the 
bread and butter studies that address 
the essentials of a military service. For 
the Air Force, they would include 
analyses of the manned bomber, a new 
tactical fighter, or an improved ICBM. 
For the Navy, major force issues would 
include the Trident, aircraft carrier.,, 
and the F•l4 fighter. Major Army issues 
might be the total number of infantry 
divisions, the SAM-D system, or a new 
tank. As might be expected, the 
Marines' major force issues are amphibi� 
ous assault operations and supporting 
tactical aircraft. 
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WAR, PEACE, AND SOCIETY 
IN TIIE l 980'S 
A HISTORIAN'S VIEW 
Within a generation the world will enter a new millennium. While many 
predictions about life in the 21st century have little basis, there are many serious 
attempts to study the future in order to aid and to promote technological, 
economic, and social planning by posing "conjeatures11 about life in the coming 
century. Professor Preston discusses these attempts, and by using the logic of 
historians he evaluates the validity of conjecturing about the future, Long-term 
trends which are already beginning to affect human society and unanticipated 
factors may subsequently turn out to have been decisive. 
by 
ProfeSBor Richard A. Preston 
History, it is said, stops with the 
present. Because historical methodology 
depends on the use of written records 
and related evidence, and because there 
are no records of the future, the his­
torical process was long considered only 
as one in which an infinite variety of 
factors, some of them unmeasurable and 
others unforeseeable, and all liable to be 
affected by human free-will intervention 
or by chance, created a future that was 
inevitably unique and discrete, and 
therefore unpredictable. From time to 
time a scholar claimed to discern pat­
terns in history that projected the past 
through the present to the future. But 
those who attempted in various ways to 
analyze or describe what would come, 
for instance Karl Marx, Oswald Speng• 
ler, Vladimir Lenin, H.G. Wells, and 
Arnold Toynbee, all talked in terms of 
centuries 1 of epochs, or of unstated 
far-off periods. Today they would be 
called macrohistorians. Macrohistorians 
were usually held in low esteem by 
colleagues. The study of the future has, 
in fact, only very recently become more 
academically respectable than the classi­
cal practice of examining the entrails of 
birds or the Victorian interest in the 
dregs in tea cups. Hence, not so very 
long ago, a proposal to discuss the shape 
of even ts and society in a coming 
decade would have been frowned upon 
as educated guessing or even as mere 
speculation. 
The rapid march of technological 
progress in the recent past has worked a 
revolution in thought about the future. 
The technical developments that are a 
dominant feature of modern life require 
thorough, detailed planning; and the 
close relation between technology and 
science, with its strict laws, makes such 
planning possible. Furthermore, the 
implementation and application of tech­
nological planning calls for economic 
planning that is now facilitated by 
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Since the Cuban missile cr1S1s in 1962, the Soviet Navy has developed a 
well-equipped, flexible, offensive force. Shedding its former predominantly defensive 
role, the Soviet Navy now possesses not only the largest submarine force in the world 
but also a modern surface warship fleet, capable of operating routinely in distant 
oceans. There has been much discussion of the effect of the Cuban confrontation on 
this expansion. Was that crisis the "catalyst which activated a vigorous Soviet 
response,,? Did the Soviets resolve to "turn the tables"? Or1 had they already 
planned to expand and strengthen their naval forces as a result of longstanding 
political ambitions and a growing U.S. threat? Lieutenant Commander Ullman 
maintains that the impetus for the Soviet naval development antedated the Cuban 
missile crisis. 
THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 
AND SOVIET NAVAL DEVELOPMENT 
MYTHS AND REALITIES 
by 
Lieutenant Commander Harlan K, Ullman, U,S, Navy 
To many Western analysts, one of 
the most significant and long,term ef­
fects of the United States-Soviet con­
frontation in the Caribbean during the 
October 1962 Cuban missile crisis was 
on the Soviet Navy and its subsequent 
expansion in terms of capability and in 
scope of operations. According to this 
argument. the Soviet uleadership," 
seeing its policies outflanked and over­
run because of its maritime I inferiority
vis-a-vis the United States, embarked on 
a deliberate plan to develop and to 
procure a naval force capable of both 
supporting foreign policy objectives and 
protecting 0state interests" almost any­
where on the world 1s· oceans. Accord­
ingly, subsequent evidence, such as the 
increase in the scale of Soviet naval 
operations (for example, the size and 
pattern of deployments to the Mediter­
ranean, Indian Ocean 1 and Caribbean 
and exercises such as Okean 75) and the 
expansion of naval capabilities in ballis­
tic missile submarine, (FBM's) as well as 
in more conventional force aspects (the 
Kiev class VTL/STL aircraft carriers and 
the Kara cruisers}, 2 is cited as under­
scoring the results of the Cuban missile 
crisis and Soviet perceptions of naval 
inferiority, 
Thus, if this argument is correct, it 
could be suggested that had First Secre­
tary Khrushchev not decided to station 
"offensive" missiles in Cuba, the Soviet 
Navy would never have been able to 
sever as dramatically the umbilical cord 
previously linking it to coastal and 
anti-invasion defense; anticarrier opera­
tions, and support of the army's mari­
time flanks. But is it correct? 
In order to sort out some of the 
myths from the realities concerning the 
impact of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis 
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ADMIRAL ERNEST J. KING 
AND 
THE STATEGY FOR VICTORY IN THE PACIFIC 
Even though he was often described as being ruthless and abrasive to both 
subordinates and contemporaries, Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King was eminently 
successful as both Chief of Naval Operations and Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, 
during World War II. His skill, forcefulness, and self.confidence were essential 
elements to his success. In his effort to insure victory in the Pacific, he encountered 
several obstacles, some of which resulted more from conflicting personalities than 
from differences in strategic concepts. Clark G. Reynolds examines some of those 
obstacles and describes how they were overcome. 
by 
Professor Clark G. Reynolds 
American naval policy and doctrine 
from 1900 to World War ll was oriented 
almost exclusively to the Pacific and 
Japan (save for World War I), an orienta· 
lion thoroughly adhered to by Ernest J. 
King at least from the time he earned 
his aviator's wings in 1926. Unlike his 
interwar contemporaries in the Army 
who were either apathetic or pessimistic 
about a war in the Pacific/ King and 
the Navy in fleet maneuvers and theo­
retical studies fashioned a naval strategy 
designed to defeat Japan, the ORANGE 
enemy. King himself therefore de· 
veloped a consistency of thought and 
singlemindedness of purpose which 
during World War II his peers and 
detractors alike found maddening. 
In the fleet problems of 1931 and 
1 932, as captain of the aircraft carrier 
Lexington, King fought mock naval 
battles in the waters of the Galapagos 
and Hawaiian islands, respectively. In 
1932-1933 he war gamed a cross-ocean 
offensive against Japan as a senior stu• 
dent at the Naval War College. While 
Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics, 
1933-1936, as a rear admiral, King was 
Fleet Commander Adm. Joseph Mason 
Reeves' choice to command the U.S. 
Fleet in the Pacific should war come. In 
the rank of vice admiral, first as Patrol 
Plane Commander then Carrier Com• 
mander in the Pacific during 1937-1939, 
King toured American island bases, par• 
ticipated in two fleet problems involving 
attacks on Pearl Harbor, and devised 
carrier tactics. And while a member of 
the General Board, 1939-1941, Admiral 
Paper delivered to joint meeting
1 
American 
Historical Association and the American Com• 
mittee on the History of the Second World 
War, Atlanta, Ga., 30 December 1975, 
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The 1965 abortive coup by the Communist Party of Indonesia against the 
established political order was a unique and extremely important event In Asian 
history. Although it was totally unsuccessful and was suppressed in less than 2 days, 
the consequences included a massive and bloody elimination of Indonesian 
Communists and their sympathizers. Captain Burgess describes what took place 
during the revolution and its aftermath. He examines the objectives of the 
revolutionary leaders, the means they used, and how and why they failed. In so 
doing, he discusses many problems he found inherent in the Indonesian Communist 
Party. 
GESTAPO-TEN YEARS AFfER 
by 
Captain L.K. Burgess, U.S. Marine Corps 
March l 976 commemorates the I 0th 
anniversary of the culmination of a 
series of even ts which is one of the 
watersheds of contemporary Asian his­
tory. These events began in October 
1965 with an attempt by the Commu­
nist Party of Indonesia (PK!) to over­
throw the government of President 
Sukarno and establish itself as a revolu­
tionary power at a time when similar 
Communist attempts in Southeast Asia 
were not going well. Indonesian military 
forces under the skillful leadership of 
General Suharto quickly rallied and 
turned the tide against the Communists 
and in favor of the established political 
order. 
Indonesia is as much a keystone to 
stability in Southeast Asia today as it 
was 10 years ago. Had the PKI been 
successful in October 1965, it would 
have established a base from which it 
could have expanded its control over 
the resource laden archipelago. 
The significance of the Suharto vic­
tory takes on added importance when it 
is viewed in the light of the political 
developments in Southeast Asia in 
1975. Less than a decade ago, many 
scholars, analysts, and political leaders 
quickly dismissed such notions as the 
"domino theory" as so much nonsense 
while they proclaimed uwars of national 
liberation" were merely civil conflicts of 
little matter to the policies of the 
United States. Today, after the rapid 
and successive loss to the Communists 
of three Southeast Asian nations, an 
assessment made in 1966 that a PK! 
victory would have ensured the spread 
of Communist power "like a great nut­
cracker with one prong stretching south� 
ward from Hanoi and the other north• 
ward from Jakarta"1 seems reasonable.
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Both the Uniform Code of Military Justice, enacted in 1950, and the Military 
Justice Act of 1968 were designed to insure that the military justice system does not 
infringe on the individual rights and freedoms of armed service members, whiJe at the 
same time reinforcing the military ethic and its derivative, discipline. Lieutenant 
Colonel Poydasheff discusses these two concepts and how both have been 
successfully woven into the present-day framework of the U.S. system of military 
justice. 
MILITARY JUSTICE 
A REINFORCER OF DISCIPLINE 
by 
Lieutenant Colonel Robert S. Poydasheff, JAGC, U.S. Army 
The American involvement in Viet­
nam generated intense soul-searching, 
questioning, and argument among vari­
ous segments of American society. In 
particular, the My Lai cases and other 
incidents focused public attention upon 
the existing system of military criminal 
law. 1 Many Americans, having little or 
no professional contact with the Armed 
Forces, were exposed to highly mis­
leading and inaccurate generalizations 
and conceptualizations concerning a 
system that "is now a sophisticated 
system of justice. "2 The military justice
system must enjoy public confidence 
and understanding, because "a system 
of justice is merely as good as the public 
believes it to be."3 There is little, if any, 
value in the system if it is not trusted or 
understood by the American public. 
Unfortunately, some observers 
wrongly perceive the military justice 
system as a system remote from Ameri­
can military ethical considerations, 
having no nexus to justice. They see it 
as one operating to the prejudice of the 
accused by failing to accord him the 
procedural and substantive protections 
of the judicial process under the Consti­
tution and the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure.4 One writer has
even erroneously asserted that: "None 
of the travesties of justice perpetuated 
under the UCMJ is really very surprising 
for military law has always been and 
continues to be primarily an instrument 
of discipline, not justice. "5
The Uniform Code of Military Jus­
tice does not reflect a congressional 
Prepared for the 1975 Annual Conference 
of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed 
Forces and Society, Chicago, 16-18 October 
1975. 
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Abbazia, Patrick. Mr. Roosevelt'sNavy­
The Private War of the U.S. Atlantic 
Fleet, 1939-1942. Annapolis, U.S. 
Naval Institute Press, 1975. 520pp. 
The Atlantic Fleet was the first Ameri-
can force to fight in World War II. The 
destroyer Reuben James was sunk by a 
German submarine on Halloween 1941, 
nearly 6 weeks before the attack on Pearl 
Harbor. This sinking was probably inevi­
table in view of President Roosevelt's 
ascent on the ladder of escalation in order 
to render necessary aid and assistance to 
the British. This ascent was deliberate, 
and it was based on the realizat ion that 
the security of the United States de­
pended upon the survival of Great Britain 
in the struggle with Nazi Germany. 
Shortly after the 1937 Japanese at­
tack on the Panay in the Yangtze River, 
President Roosevelt was reported to have 
said, "If Italy and Japan have evolved a 
technique of fighting without declaring 
war, why can't we develop a similar 
one?" Starting with the dispatch of Capt. 
Royal Ingersoll, USN, to London at th e 
end of 1937 to discuss the "possibility" 
of cooperation with the British (he was 
not authorized to make commitments) 
until the President's famous "shoot on 
sight" order late in I 941, the Atlantic 
Squadron (later the Atlantic Fleet) was 
the instrument of what must be a classic 
case of escalation. 
With admirable thoroughness, Patrick 
Abbazia has drawn upon the relevant 
U.S. Navy records, including action re­
ports and extensive interviews with par� 
ticipants, to present a fascinating and 
well-written account of how the Navy 
PROFESSIONAL 
READING 
fought a war without one being declared. 
He also makes good use of tho available 
German records. Beginning with a de­
scription of Fleet Exercise XX in 1939, 
he continues the narrative through the 
Neutrality Patrol, tho details of the actual 
transfer of destroyers to tho Royal Navy 
in 1940, the plans for a preemptive 
occupation of Martinique, and the ardu­
ous surface and air operations in the 
North Atlantic. He even includes a fasci­
nating account of Adm. Jonas Ingram's 
activities in the South Atlantic. 
Telling tho story of what the Atlantic 
Fleet did is the great strength of this 
book. It is a salty account, calculated to 
appeal to naval buffs andserious students 
alike. The author conveys with great 
feeling and compassion just what it was 
like to serve in a pitching, rolling de­
stroyer under extraordinarily trying con­
ditions in what must be the most abomi­
nable weather known to seafarers. Such 
sympathetic, personal in sigh ts lend an alr 
of reality to naval operations and to the 
strategy upon which they were based, 
which is all too often ignored in contem­
porary literature. 
The tactical problems in developing 
even the rudiments of ASW, to say 
nothing of convoy protection, were enor• 
mous. Coupled with the growing pains of 
an eKpanding navy in which experienced 
personnel seemed to have been a vanish­
ing breed, these tactical problems might 
very well have overwhelmed a less profes­
sional navy, The officers and men who 
gave their laudable best, and then some, 
successfully endured trying conditions 
and reduced tactical and operational 
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